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We report results from an experiment in which humans repeatedly play one of two
games against a computer program that follows either a reinforcement or an experience
weighted attraction learning algorithm. Our experiment shows these learning algo-
rithms detect exploitable opportunities more sensitively than humans. Also, learning
algorithms respond to detected payoff-increasing opportunities systematically; how-
ever, the responses are too weak to improve the algorithms’ payoffs. Human play
against various decision maker types does not vary significantly. These factors lead to a
strong linear relationship between the humans’ and algorithms’ action choice propor-
tions that is suggestive of the algorithms’ best response correspondences.
& 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Researchers have exerted considerable efforts identifying how individuals adjust behavior in repeated decision making
tasks. A sizable literature has approached this question by developing hypotheses about the learning process, then
embedding the hypotheses in a parametric model, and subsequently estimating the model’s parameters from experiments
in which human subjects repeatedly play some stage game. The learning-in-games models within this literature have
consolidated to a formulation with two main components. The first component is a rule that assigns a value to each of a
player’s actions conditional upon the history of play, and the second component converts these values into a probability
distribution that governs the player’s action choice—in effect, a mixed strategy. Three examples of such models are
cautious fictitious play (Fudenberg and Levine, 1995), reinforcement learning (Erev and Roth, 1998), and experienced
weighted attraction (Camerer and Ho, 1999).
We uncover two important properties of this class of models. First, the models are more sensitive than human subjects
at detecting exploitable trends in opponent play. Moreover, the models’ action frequencies exhibit strikingly linear
adjustments toward best response. Second, these adjustments are too weak to generate any significant gains in payoffs.
The probabilistic choice components generate responses that are less aggressive than those made by human subjects in
other studies.ll rights reserved.
achat), swarthout@gsu.edu (J.T. Swarthout).
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treatments in which each human plays against another human and use these data to estimate parameters of alternative
learning models. Then we conduct hybrid treatments in which each human repeatedly plays against a computer
implementation of one of the estimated learning models. Finally we generate parallel simulations in which an estimated
version of a model plays against itself. Through our hybrid treatments we control for the strategic interdependence of the
adaptive behavior of subjects—a main source of the econometric difficulties when estimating these models (Salmon,
2001).
Our methodological approach and analysis is congruent with some of the research in agent-based computational
economics. Frequently in agent-based studies, simulation results are sensitive to the behavioral rules assigned to the
agents. In an effort to develop appropriate simulation models, agent-based studies often adopt behavioral rules estimated
from human experiments.1 Conducting hybrid studies with humans and agents interacting is a natural extension that is
suggested by influential survey articles such as Duffy (2006) and Richiardi et al. (2006). The notion that an appropriate
model should generate data in both simulations and human–computer interaction similar to data from pure human
interaction is the core idea of our research approach.
A simple ideal motivates our approach: a model is considered the ‘‘true’’ model if human versus computer play is
indistinguishable from human versus human play. When differences in play can be identified (which will almost surely
happen given the lofty benchmark), these differences should suggest how one can refine the model. This hybrid procedure
can also help in developing new learning models: by systematically varying the strategies against which people play, we
can obtain descriptions of how humans play against a variety of models (Shachat and Swarthout, 2004; Spiliopoulos,
2008). In addition to identifying how closely a model mimics human behavior, we can also assess the effectiveness of a
model by comparing its earnings to those of humans in the same settings.2
In our study we consider reinforcement (RE hereafter) and experience-weighted attraction (EWA hereafter) learning
models.3 Since the introduction of these two models over a decade ago, researchers have used variations of the models in a
wide assortment of settings. Within the behavioral game theory literature, these models have been successfully applied to
behavior in a variety of scenarios: games with unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Mookherjee and Sopher, 1994,
1997), bargaining games (Slonim and Roth, 1998; Grosskopf, 2003), public goods games (Chen and Tang, 1998; Bo and
Frechette, 2011), games of asymmetric information (Feltovich, 2000), and games uniquely solved by rationalizability (Ho
et al., 1998; Weber, 2003).4 Beyond this literature, RE and EWA have been used to analyze applied economic problems
such as the performance of organ donor matching mechanisms (Zhang, 2010), portfolio allocation and savings decisions
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Choi et al., 2009), formation of market price expectations (Heemeijer et al., 2009; Hommes,
2011), and inventory management in supply chains (Bostian et al., 2008; Bolton and Katok, 2008). The widespread success
of the RE and EWA models within the behavioral game literature and their adoption by researchers in areas beyond make
them natural candidates for our investigation.
We also adopt a pair of 22 normal forms games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium that is in mixed strategies.
We select these games because of specific properties which benefit our purposes. First, each player has only two strategies,
minimizing the number of parameters we need to estimate, and correspondingly increasing the power of our statistical
inferences and tests. Next, with a low number of action profiles, we aim to avoid games for which play quickly converges
to a pure Nash equilibrium strategy profile, and consequently limits the ability of the two learning models to generate
distinct predictions. Hence we choose games with a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Further, we chose to avoid games
with multiple Nash equilibria, as we want to avoid the confound of equilibrium selection. Finally, we select our games
because in pure human play, many cohorts do not converge to the Nash equilibrium within 200 repetitions, and further
exhibit interesting non-constant dynamics in choice proportions. This presents an opportunity for the learning algorithms
to provide a better fit to the data than static equilibrium notions, such as Nash or Quantal Response Equilibrium (McKelvey
and Palfrey, 1995; Selten and Chmura, 2008), which is not often the case with low dimension normal form games with a
unique, mixed strategy solution.







In the human versus human treatments we find that, as is found uniformly across studies, the estimated adaptive rules
have significant memory. As a consequence, the impact of recent outcomes on action values (and thus on mixed
strategies) is very small. This leads to viscous adjustment rules in simulations. By viscous, we simply mean that the
mixed strategies exhibit little change from period to period.1 For example, see Andreoni and Miller (1995), Duffy (2001), Markose et al. (2007), and Houser and Kurzban (2002).
2 This is similar in spirit to the notion of a model’s economic value as discussed by Camerer et al. (2002, 2003).
3 There are many other similarly structured models worthy of studying with our technique, but models in this class tend to generate similar play
lmon, 2001).
4 But there are caveats as well: the models fail to capture the heterogeneous behavior exhibited across subjects (Cheung and Friedman, 1997);
ans have an ability to detect and exploit intertemporal choice patterns by their opponents which the models do not (Sonsino and Sirota, 2003;
kherji and Runkle, 2000); and humans are more successful at establishing reciprocal behavior in the repeated game environments (Andreoni and
ler, 1993; Cooper et al., 1996).
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In the simulations, models generate behavior that correspond to average human play but display less variation.
Specifically, we find that, as is found in other studies, the average joint choice frequencies generated by the model
simulations correspond to those generated by human pairs. However, the variance of these joint frequencies in the
simulations is much lower than we observe in the human treatments.3. In both simulations and human treatments, there is no correlation in the joint action frequencies across fixed pairs of
opponents within the same game treatment.4. In stark contrast to the previous result, there exists a highly correlated relationship between the joint action
frequencies of computer–human pairs in the hybrid treatments. This linear best response is a strong linear relationship
between the humans’ and algorithms’ action choice proportions that are suggestive of the algorithms’ best response
correspondence. Accordingly, when a human’s action frequency deviates from the Nash equilibrium proportion,
the algorithm’s action frequency proportionally adjusts toward its pure strategy best response. This allows us to
conclude that the learning models are more sensitive than humans at detecting payoff-increasing opportunities and
correspondingly adjusting play whenever a human opponent’s action frequency deviates from the Nash equilibrium
proportion.5. While the adjustments by the models are remarkably systematic when pitted against humans, the magnitude of the
adjustments is quite weak. Indeed, too weak to result in statistically significant gains in payoffs. In all six computer–
human treatments, the average earnings of the models are not statistically significantly more than those of humans in
equivalent roles. Moreover, in two of these cases the humans earn statistically significantly more. However, in both of
these cases, we show that the probabilistic best response component is the main source of model’s lower earnings.
Our results explain and unify some previous findings counter to the implications of the considered learning models.
First, the viscous property of the learning models’ mixed strategy sequences suggest that a more appropriate model should
generate more dramatic changes in period-to-period mixed strategy formulation. One such example is presented by
Nyarko and Schotter (2002) (NS hereafter). NS elicit subjects’ beliefs of opponents’ actions in a repeated game similar to
what we use, and observe that subjects wildly revise their elicited beliefs from period to period. NS formulate a model in
which the expected values of actions, calculated using the stated beliefs, are incorporated into a probabilistic logit choice
rule. After conducting a series of goodness-of-fit exercises, NS conclude this model outperforms both the RE and EWA
models. Our results suggest that the NS model gains its effectiveness from its ability to allow for greater period-to-period
changes in the likelihoods of action choices. The implied volatile mixed strategies of the NS model are supported when
subjects are asked to explicitly choose mixed strategies in studies such as Shachat (2002) and Noussair and Willinger
(2003).
Second, our demonstration that probabilistic learning models accurately detect but only weakly best respond to
nonequilibrium play is in direct contrast with what humans do. In studies such as Shachat and Swarthout (2004), Fox
(1972), and Lieberman (1962), subjects play against non-optimal but unknown mixed strategies in repeated zero-sum
games. Subjects only detect these non-optimal strategies if they are far enough removed from the minimax strategies.
However, once detected, subjects move decisively toward best response and increase their payoffs.
We next proceed with a discussion of several past studies that incorporate human versus computer game play. We then
present the two learning models used in our study. In the fourth section we discuss the games used in our experiment and
our experimental procedures. The fifth section covers our experiment results, findings, and interpretations. In conclusion,
we integrate our results with other experimental results to provide a summary of human play in games, and suggest future
directions for formulation and parameter selection in learning models.
2. Man versus the machine
Human players and computerized decision makers have interacted in a number of previous studies. This technique has
been used to identify social preferences in strategic settings (Houser and Kurzban, 2002; McCabe et al., 2001), to establish
experimental control over player expectations in games (Roth and Schoumaker, 1983; Winter and Zamir, 2005), and to
identify how humans play against particular strategies in games (Walker et al., 1987). Especially noteworthy, Duersch
et al. (2010) investigated how human subjects perform against a variety of learning algorithms in Cornout duopoly games,
and found that humans regularly increased their earning against most adaptive type algorithms. The source of this
exploitation is the vulnerability of adaptive algorithms to be coaxed into predictable choice patterns.
For the remainder of this section, we summarize prior results on how humans play against unique minimax solutions,
non-optimal stationary mixed strategies, and variants of the fictitious play dynamic (with deterministic choice rules) in
repeated constant-sum games with unique minimax solutions in mixed strategies. Many of the studies we discuss used
fixed human–computer pairs playing repetitions of one of the zero-sum games presented in Fig. 1.5 Studies by Lieberman
(1962), Messick (1967), Fox (1972), and Shachat et al. (2011) all contain treatments with humans playing against an
experimenter-implemented minimax strategy. In these studies, the human participants were not informed of the explicit5 In some of these studies the experimenters implemented stationary mixed strategies by using pre-selected computer generated random sequences
heir non-computerized experiments.
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Fig. 1. Zero-sum games used in previous studies (payoffs are for row player, minimax strategy proportions are next to action names).
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not correspond to the minimax prediction, and only in the Fox study does the human play adjust – albeit weakly – toward
the minimax prediction. These results are not surprising: when a ‘‘computer’’ adopts its minimax strategy, the expected
payoffs of a human player’s actions are all equal.
This indifference is not present when the computer adopts non-minimax mixed strategies. Lieberman (1962) and Fox
(1972) also studied human play against non-optimal stationary mixed strategies and discovered that human players do
significantly adjust their play (although not to the extent of exclusively playing the pure strategy best response) and also
significantly increase – in a statistical sense – their payoffs above minimax value levels. In the relevant Lieberman
treatment, subjects played against the experimenter for a total of 200 periods. In the first 100 periods, the experimenter
played his minimax strategy of (0.25, 0.75) and then in the final 100 periods the experimenter played a non-minimax
strategy of (0.5, 0.5). Human players were not informed that their opponent had adjusted his strategy. Human play
adjusted from best responding approximately 20% of the time immediately after the experimenter began non-minimax
play, to best responding approximately 70% of the time by the end of the session. This shift toward the best response was
also a shift toward the human’s minimax strategy, making it difficult to differentiate between the attractiveness of the
minimax strategy and the best response.
In one of Fox’s treatments, each human participant played 200 periods against a computer which played the non-
minimax mixed strategy (0.6, 0.4) for the entire session. This design placed the human’s best response of (1, 0) on the
opposite side of (0.5, 0.5) from the human’s minimax strategy of (0.214, 0.786). Initial human play of their first action was
slightly above 50%, and then slowly adjusted toward the pure strategy best response over the course of the experiment.
Specifically, human players approached the best response 75% of the time. These experiments demonstrate that human
participants will adjust their behavior (but not as much as possible) to take advantage of exploitable stationary mixed
strategies. Furthermore, the human subjects in both studies statistically improved their payoffs.
In a study designed to ascertain how far a mixed strategy must deviate from the minimax strategy before humans
exploit it, Shachat and Swarthout (2004) systematically vary the fixed mixed strategy across subjects and observe that
when a computerized strategy deviates by more than 15% from the minimax strategy of two-thirds, human play begins
converging to best response.7 Furthermore, many subjects in this study adjusted to exclusive play of the best response
action – a behavior which was not apparent in the aggregate data presented in the previous studies.
Messick (1967), Coricelli (2001), and Spiliopoulos (2008) all conducted experiments to evaluate how human players
respond when playing against variations of fictitious play.8 These experiments are notable in that the computer’s strategy
was responsive to the actions selected by its opponent. Messick studied human subjects matched against two fictitious
play algorithms: one with unlimited memory and the other with only a five period memory. Against unlimited memory
fictitious play, human players earned substantially more than their minimax payoff level. Human players earned an even
greater average payoff against limited memory fictitious play. In the study by Coricelli, there are two treatments – both
utilizing the game form introduced by O’Neill (1987) – in which human participants play against unlimited memory6 When reported, human participants were instructed something similar to: ‘‘The computer has been programmed to play so as to make as much
money as possible. Its goal in the game is to minimize the amount of money you win and to maximize its own winnings,’’ Messick (1967, p. 35).
7 This study used the Pursue-Evade game adopted herein and presented in Fig. 2.
8 In the original formulations of fictitious play (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951), a player uses the empirical distribution of the entire history of his
opponent’s action choices as his belief of the opponent’s current mixed strategy and then chooses a best response to this belief.
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In both treatments, human participants win significantly more often against the algorithms than they do against human
opponents.9 Spiliopoulos studied human play against a variety of fictitious play algorithms, including those with varying
memory, pattern detection, and aggressive probabilistic choice rules.10 The main findings were that subjects generally
could exploit the algorithms and that subjects play differently conditional on the algorithm they faced. Establishing that
humans can ‘‘outgame’’ these algorithms is significant, and has theoretical basis. It is well known that in games with a
unique mixed strategy equilibrium, the fictitious play algorithm can generate strong positively serially correlated action
choices that are easily exploited (Jordan, 1993; Gjerstad, 1996). It was this speculated vulnerability that partially
motivated game theorists to propose and study adaptive learning models which incorporated probabilistic choice as a key
component.
To summarize, prior experiments pairing human subjects against algorithms in constant sum games with strictly mixed
strategy solutions have taught us that: (1) human players do not tend to play their minimax strategy in response to
opponents playing their minimax strategy; (2) human players exploit opponents who play mixed strategies significantly
different from their minimax strategy; and (3) human players exploit adaptive algorithms which generate highly serially
correlated action choices.
3. Response algorithms
In this section we describe the reinforcement learning model of Erev and Roth (1998) and the experience Weighted
Attraction model of Camerer and Ho (1999). Our descriptions of the model formulations and estimation techniques follow
the original presentations as close as possible. Nonetheless, we only consider 22 games and in some instances we
simplify notation without changing the models.
3.1. Reinforcement learning
Erev and Roth’s model (hereafter RE) is motivated by the reinforcement hypothesis from psychology: an action’s score
is incremented by a greater amount when it results in a ‘‘positive’’ outcome rather than a ‘‘negative’’ outcome. More
formally, let Rij(t) denote player i’s score for his jth action prior to the game at iteration t; let sijðtÞ denote the probability
that i chooses j at iteration t; and let Xi denote the set of player i’s possible stage-game payoffs. The two initial conditions of
the dynamic system are: (1) at the initial iteration, each of a player’s actions has the same probability of being selected (in
the 22 case each action is chosen with probability one-half); and (2) the initial score of each actions is
Rijð1Þ ¼ sijð1ÞSð1ÞXi ,
where S(1) is an unobservable strength parameter, which influences the player’s sensitivity to subsequent experience, and
Xi is the absolute value of player i’s payoff averaged across all action profiles.
After an iteration, each action’s score is updated as follows:
Rijðtþ1Þ ¼ ð1fÞRijðtÞþðð12eÞIðaiðtÞ ¼ jÞ þeÞðpiðj,kÞminfXigÞ,
where f is an unobservable parameter that discounts past scores, IðaiðtÞ ¼ jÞ is an indicator function for the event that player i
selected action j in period t, e is an unobservable parameter determining the relative impacts on the scores of the selected
versus the unselected action, and piðj,kÞ is i’s payoff when he plays action j against the opponent’s action k. Also player i’s
minimum possible payoff for any action profile, minfXig, is subtracted from piðj,aiðtÞÞ as a normalization to avoid negative





For each game we consider, parameters of the model are estimated along the lines suggested by Erev and Roth.
We estimate the values of S(1), f, and e by minimizing the mean square error of the predicted proportions of Left play in
20-period trial blocks for the human versus human treatments. More specifically, for each fixed triple of parameter values
from a discrete grid we proceed as follows: we simulate the play of 500 fixed pairs engaging in 200 iterations, and then we
calculate separately the frequency of Left play by the 500 Row players and by the 500 Column players in each 20-period
block. These frequencies are the model’s predictions for that triple of parameter values. The grid is then searched for the
optimal parameters.
3.2. Experience-weighted attraction
We use the version of EWA developed by Camerer and Ho (1999). While the structure of the EWA formulation is similar
to the RE learning model, it adopts a different parametric form of probabilistic choice and it updates actions’ scores9 Human versus human data for this conclusion are taken from O’Neill (1987) and Shachat (2002).
10 The computerized decision makers followed the algorithm prescription 80% of the time and played the minimax strategy 20% of the time.
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where at stage t player i chooses action j with probability sijðtÞ, where l is the inverse precision (variance) parameter, and
where Rij(t) is a scoring function, as in the RE model, albeit defined (i.e., updated) differently. The updating of Rij(t) involves
a discounting factor N(t), which is updated according to Nðtþ1Þ ¼ rNðtÞþ1 for t^1, where r is an unobservable discount
parameter and N(1) is an unobservable parameter, interpreted as the strength of experience prior to the beginning of play.
The score Rij(t) is updated as follows:
Rijðtþ1Þ ¼
NðtÞfRijðtÞþðð1eÞIðaiðtÞ ¼ jÞ þeÞpiðj,kÞ
Nðtþ1Þ
,
where piðj,kÞ, f, and e are interpreted as in the Erev and Roth model. Initial scores Rij(1) for each i and j are additional
unobservable parameters.
Parameters of the EWA model are estimated via maximum likelihood. EWA is a flexible specification that includes
several other models as special cases. For example, a simple reinforcement learning model, which has a different
parametric form than RE, is generated when N(1)¼0, e¼ 0, and r¼ 0; and probabilistic fictitious play is generated when
e¼ r¼f¼ 1.11
4. Experimental procedure
We have three basic steps in our experimental methodology. First, we collect baseline data samples consisting of fixed
human versus human pairs that play 100 or 200 rounds of one of two 22 games. Second, we estimate parameters for the
two learning models separately for each of the two games. In the third step, we conduct new sessions with inexperienced
subjects. Each subject is paired with a computer clone programmed with one of the estimated algorithms for his game role,
and this pair plays against another human–clone pair. We proceed by describing the two games we use and then present
more details on the outlined steps.
4.1. The two games
The first game we consider is a zero-sum asymmetric game called Pursue-Evade. This game was introduced by
Rosenthal et al. (2002) (hereafter RSW). The normal form representation of the game is given in Fig. 2. The minimax
solution (and Nash equilibrium) of this game is symmetric with each player choosing Left with probability of two-thirds.
There are several reasons why this game is a strong candidate to use in our study. First, zero-sum games eliminate
social utility concerns often found in experimental studies of games, thereby mitigating some behavioral effects that might
arise if a human suspects he is playing against a computer rather than another human. Second, with some standard
behavioral assumptions, the repeated game has a unique Nash equilibrium path which calls for repeated play of the stage
game Nash equilibrium. This eliminates potential repeated game effects that the algorithms are not designed to address.
Third, Pursue-Evade is a simple game in which the Nash equilibrium predictions differ from equiprobable choice. This
provides a powerful test against the alternative hypothesis of equiprobable play.
Our second game poses a more difficult challenge to the learning algorithms. We refer to our second game, presented in
Fig. 3, as Gamble-Safe. Each player has a Gamble action (Left for each player) from which he receives a payoff of either two
or zero, and a Safe action (Right for each player) which guarantees a payoff of one. This game has a unique mixed strategy
in which each player chooses his Left action with probability one-half, and his expected Nash equilibrium payoff is one.
Notice that this game is not constant-sum; therefore the minimax solution need not coincide with the Nash equilibrium. In
this game, Right is a pure minimax strategy for both players that guarantees a payoff of one. A game for which minimax
and Nash equilibrium solutions differ but generate the same expected payoff is called an unprofitable game.12 The
potential attraction of the minimax strategy can (and does) prove to be difficult for the learning algorithms which, loosely
speaking, probabilistically best respond.
4.2. Protocols
The laboratory sessions reported in this study were conducted in October and November of 2000 at the dedicated
experimental economics laboratory at the IBM TJ Watson research center in Yorktown Heights, NY, and at the University of
California, San Diego EconLab in the department of economics. All subjects were undergraduate students at either Pace11 We refer the reader to Camerer and Ho (1999) for more discussion of how EWA can emulate various models and for a more complete
interpretation of the parameters.
12 Morgan and Sefton (2002) present a noteworthy study of human play in unprofitable games.
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Fig. 3. The Gamble-Safe game.
Table 1
Description of laboratory sessions.
Game Opponent type Location # periods # subjects
Gamble-Safe Human IBM 100 10
Gamble-Safe Human IBM 200 14
Gamble-Safe Human UCSD 200 6
Gamble-Safe RE UCSD 200 24
Pursue-Evade EWA IBM 200 6
Pursue-Evade EWA UCSD 200 24
Pursue-Evade RE UCSD 200 30
Note: Pursue-Evade Human data are from RSW and thus not listed above.
J. Shachat, J.T. Swarthout / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 7University or UCSD, recruited through flyers posted on campus or from visiting classroom lectures within the economics
department or business school. Subjects were paid a show-up fee independent of, and in addition to, their performance in
the experiment. Each session was completed in under an hour. At UCSD, the exchange rate for experimental currency to US
dollars was ten to one. At IBM, a more generous exchange rate typically of four to one was used. In this case, the
compensation was larger due to the inconvenience of traveling to the TJ Watson research facility. As in Rosenthal et al.
(2002), subjects in the Evader role of the Pursue-Evade game received an endowment of 300 units of experimental
currency. The breakdown of sample sizes based upon game, opponent, location, and number of periods is given in
Table 1.134.2.1. Human versus human baselines
For the human versus human baseline play in the Pursue-Evade game we use the data from RSW. In their hand-run
experiment, a pair of subjects was seated on the same side of a table with an opaque screen between the subjects. Each
player was given two index cards: one labeled Left and the other labeled Right. At each iteration the players slid their
chosen cards face down to the experimenter seated across the table. Then the experimenter simultaneously turned over
the cards, executed the payoffs, and recorded the actions. The exchange rate of experimental currency to US dollars was six
to one. Twenty pairs of human subjects played this treatment: fourteen for 100 periods and six for 200 periods. Subjects in
the Evader role were given endowments of 150 and 300 units of experimental currency for 100 and 200 period sessions,
respectively.1413 We explain in Section 5 why we have no observations for the EWA Gamble-Safe treatment.
14 While bankruptcy was theoretically possible, no subject came remotely close to a balance of zero in the Evader role.
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Each subject was seated at a separate computer terminal such that no subject could observe the screen of any other
subject. Subjects began by reading interactive instructions on their computer.15 Within each fixed pair, each subject played
either the Row or Column role for the entire session. Fifteen pairs of subjects participated in this treatment, with five pairs
each playing 100 periods and ten pairs each playing 200 periods. At the beginning of each repetition, a subject saw a
graphical representation of the game on the screen. A Column player’s display of the game was transformed so that he
appeared to be a Row player. Thus, each subject selected an action by clicking on a row, and then confirmed his selection.
Each subject was free to change his row selection before confirmation. Once an action was confirmed, a subject waited
until his opponent also confirmed an action. Then each subject saw the outcome highlighted on his game display, as well
as a text message stating both players’ actions and his own earnings for that repetition. Finally, at all times a history of past
play was displayed to the subject. This history consisted of an ordered list with each row displaying the number of the
iteration, the actions selected by both players, and the subject’s earnings.4.2.2. Human versus algorithm treatments
In creating the procedures for these treatments, we faced the difficult decision of what to tell subjects about their
opponents. The basic tenet of our study is to evaluate whether a model will generate indistinguishable data between
human versus human interactions and human versus model interactions. For experimental control we desire that a
subject, regardless whether he is playing against a human or algorithm, have the same homegrown beliefs regarding the
process generating his opponent’s play, and also constant preferences over the joint payoffs of game outcomes. Some
studies, for example Eckel and Grossman (1996), show that subjects’ preferences change significantly when the other
player’s payoffs go to a third party. Further, Fehr and Tyran (2007) find treatment effects when subjects are told they are
playing against a computer implemented strategy rather than another person. And perhaps most striking, McCabe et al.
(2001) find that some subjects, in addition to playing differently, exhibit activity in different regions of the brain
depending on whether an opponent is known to be a computer or another person. Consequently, given our specific
research objectives, we believe it is imperative for us to maintain constant beliefs about opponents across treatments, and





straToday you will play 200 rounds of a simple game. You have been matched to play against one other opponent. You
will play all rounds of this game against this same opponent.We conducted our hybrid treatments using the same instructions, experimental software, and protocol used for the
Gamble-Safe game baseline. In these treatments, each human–computer pair was matched with another human–
computer pair at the beginning of the session, with no rematching in subsequent periods. The two human members
within a given matching played against each other for the first 23 repetitions of the game.16 Then, beginning in repetition
24, the two humans stopped playing against each other and for the remainder of the session they each played against the
computer member of their opponent pair that implemented either the EWA or RE learning algorithm. We acknowledge
that some may disagree with not informing subjects of this switch. However, given our aim to maintain homegrown
beliefs, and the findings of the prior literature reviewed above, we concluded at the time that this approach was our best
option.
We used an initial phase of human versus human play to minimize the impact of estimated initial score values of
actions and focus our evaluation on the dynamics of the algorithm. During the first 23 repetitions, we allowed the action
value scores to ‘‘prime’’ themselves with the play generated by the subjects. (Although updating of scores was determined
by the parameter estimates obtained from the baseline treatments). That is, even though the response algorithms were not
selecting actions during the first 23 repetitions, the scores were still being updated according to the specifications of the
previous section. For example, consider the 24th repetition of a game. The human Row player now faces the computer
member of the opposing Column pair. Moreover, during the first 23 repetitions, the computer Column player updated the
scores associated with Column’s actions based on the chosen action profiles of both its human counterpart and opponent
pair’s human counterpart.
We took steps to ensure that each subject proceeds through the periods with the same natural timing whether he was
facing the human or computer member of his opponent pair. We adopted a simple technique to make the ‘‘split’’ seamless
from the subjects’ perspectives. From period 24 on, the two humans within a matching had no interaction except for the
timing of when stage game results were revealed. Specifically, although the computer opponents generated their action
choices instantly, stage game results were not revealed until both humans had selected their actions. This protocol
preserved the natural timing rhythm established by the humans in the first 23 stage games.Screenshots of the instructions are available at http://excen.gsu.edu/swarthout/learning. The experimental software is also available upon request
e authors.
The number 23 was chosen arbitrarily.
se cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
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Fig. 4. Baseline data and estimated model summary for Pursue-Evade game.
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5.1. Baseline experiments, model estimation, and simulation
Our experimental baselines are the human versus human play in each of the two games. Inspection of the aggregate
data reveals that play in the two games departs from the Nash equilibrium and the dynamic features of the data suggest
non-stationarity of play. After estimating the unobserved parameters of the learning models, we simulated large numbers
of sessions based upon these estimated versions of the models. Simulations reveal that the learning models generate
aggregate choice frequencies similar to the experimental data, but only weakly mimic the experimental data time series.
Furthermore, the simulations do not reveal striking differences between the two learning models.
We use the data from RSW as the Pursue-Evade game baseline data set. Fig. 4 shows contingency tables for the data
aggregated across subject pairs and stage games. A graph of the time series of the average proportion of Left play for the
Row and Column players is shown below each contingency table. Each observation in a series is the average across a 20
period time block. As noted by RSW, the contingency table is distinctly different from the Nash equilibrium predictions
(the numbers in parentheses) and Column subjects play Left significantly more often than the Row subjects.17 In the block
average time series, we see that the Column series almost always lies above the Row series and that both series exhibit an
increasing trend. Furthermore, as noted by RSW, there is no convergence to the Nash equilibrium by either player role.
Using these data, RSW estimated the parameters of both the RE and EWA models which are reported in Tables 2 and 3.
The estimation results are quite distinct. The estimated RE model reflects a weak strength of initial attraction levels,
moderate discounting resulting in long memory, and a very low rate of updating the scores of unselected actions. The
estimated EWA model is very different in nature, and nearly coincides with probabilistic fictitious play. Notice that the
discount rates (f and r) are nearly one – indicating long memory – and both strategies are fully updated by their payoff
against the opponent’s action, l¼ 1. Also of interest is how the initial estimated attraction levels reflect loss averse
preferences. We normalize the initial attractions for the Row and Column players by setting the RRLð1Þ ¼ RCLð1Þ ¼ 0. Recall
the sets of possible payoffs for the Right action are {2,0} and {2,0} for Row and Column respectively. For Row, this lies in
the gain space and the estimated initial attraction is 0.657, but for Column this is in the loss domain and the estimated
attraction is 1.863—almost triple the magnitude.
We provide a corresponding analysis for the Gamble-Safe game in Fig. 5. In the contingency table for the baseline data
we observe that the Row subjects play Right significantly more than Left, while Column subjects played Left more often.
This result partly comes from two pairs in which the Row and Column subjects’ action profile sequence eventually
converged to the profile (Safe, Gamble). This is evident around the midpoint of the times series for the baseline treatment,
where we see the Column and Row subjects’ series diverge.17 Moreover, the Column subject plays Left more frequently than his Row counterpart in almost all pairs.
Please cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007
Table 2





Avg. sum squared error 0.205 0.201
Table 3
EWA parameter estimates for Pursue-Evade game.
Parameter N(1) RRL(1) RRR(1) RCL(1) RCR(1) r f e l
Estimate 0.833 0.000 0.657 0.000 1.863 0.993 0.998 1.000 0.578
Std. error 0.071 – 0.075  0.054 0.047 0.004 [0.997,1]a 0.032
Ln Likelihood 16045
a Estimated using GAUSS and its constrained maximum likelihood package. Note, the constraint er1 is binding and thus the normal standard errors











(.250) (.250) (.250) (.250)
All Human Baseline Estimated RE Model

























Fig. 5. Baseline data and estimated model summary for Gamble-Safe game.
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estimation used in the EWA model. Specifically, the long strings of Left by Column leads the EWA model to assign a near
zero probability to Right (Safe) by Row for any possible parameter values. However, since Row is repeatedly choosing Right
in these instances there is a zero likelihood problem in estimating the EWA parameters. Rather than violate the maximum
likelihood criterion for parameter selection specified by Camerer and Ho (1999) we chose not to conduct a Human versus
EWA treatment for this game.
Since the parameter selection of the RE model does not rely upon maximum likelihood estimation, we obtain estimates
which generate the best fit for the baseline data, which are presented in Table 2. Here the estimated parameters are quite
different from those for the Pursue-Evade game. Most notably, the estimated strength of initial reinforcements is much
higher, as is the updating of reinforcements for the action not chosen. Also, the decay for action scores is lower, indicating
even stronger memory than in the Pursue-Evade game. Further, the estimated RE models perform practically the same
under the minimum squared error criteria for the Pursue-Evade and Gamble-Safe games.
Next, we conduct simulations to evaluate model performance. First, we simulate an experiment with 20 pairs playing
200 iterations for each estimated model and game. Second, we calculate the sample proportion and variance of Left play in
the simulated and baseline data. These are presented in Table 4. We evaluate the similarity of the first two moments of thePlease cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007
Table 4
Sample moment comparison of simulation results with human baseline data.
Pursue-Evade RE Pursue-Evade EWA Gamble-Safe RE
Row Column Row Column Row Column
% Left human 0.611 0.718 0.611 0.718 0.444 0.510
Sample variance 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.021
Observations 15 15 20 20 20 20
% Left simulation 0.683 0.715 0.643 0.688 0.434 0.524
Sample variance 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Observations 20 20 20 20 20 20
t-Statistic 2.555 0.111 1.224 1.257 0.330 0.361
p-Value 0.008 0.456 0.117 0.111 0.373 0.362
F-Statistic 10.693 9.029 4.488 8.506 20.068 39.932
p-Value 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
J. Shachat, J.T. Swarthout / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 11simulation and experimental data. In rows seven and eight, we report the results of t-tests that the sample proportions of
Left play are the same. The hypothesis that the proportion for the human data is the same as the simulation is rejected in
only one out six cases: the Pursue-Evade Row player RE simulation. Next, we conduct F-tests that the sample variance of
the Left proportions are the same and report results in the last two rows of Table 4. The hypothesis that the variances are
the same is resoundingly rejected in all cases, and clearly the variance in the simulations is lower. This suggests that the
learning models accurately track average play but not the variability.
We now consider how well the estimated models track the dynamic features of experimental game data. Using the
estimated models, we simulate 10,000 experiments of 20 pairs playing the corresponding game for 200 iterations.
Averages from the 10,000 simulated experiments were used to construct contingency tables and time series in the same
format as those presented for the baseline data. These results are presented alongside the baseline results in Figs. 4 and 5.
For the Pursue-Evade game casual observation suggests that the EWA model generates an expected contingency very close
to the human baseline and the RE model more accurately mimics dynamics in the times series. This is not surprising given
the respective objective functions used to select model parameters and estimated values. For the Gamble Safe game, we
see that the RE contingency table is remarkably similar to the baseline table. However, the predicted RE dynamics are
excessively smooth and do not resemble the baseline time series.
Comparison of the experimental data to simulations based upon estimated versions of the learning models suggests
that the learning models successfully capture some features of the humans’ disequilibrium behavior. However, time series
views of the simulation data exhibit less variable dynamics than the experiment data, which suggest that learning models
are not as responsive as humans and tend to simply fit aggregate human choice frequencies. We will see that this
conclusion could not be further from the truth. In the human–algorithm treatments the learning algorithms demonstrate
an acute ability to detect exploitable opportunities and distinctly adjust play. However, these adjustments are too timid to
be profitable.
5.2. Analysis of learning algorithm response to opponents’ play
Inspection of the pair-level data from human–algorithm treatments reveals that the learning algorithms generate
choice frequencies that are linear better responses to the choice frequencies of their human opponents. Each of Figs. 6–8 is
a 22 array of scatterplot panels. The rows of each panel array correspond to the decision maker type of the Row player:
the top row corresponds to the human decision maker and the bottom row corresponds to the computer decision maker.
Similarly the columns of each panel array correspond to the decision maker type of the Column player: the left column for
human and the right column for computer. Hence the upper left panel is from the human–human baselines, the lower
right panel is from the algorithm–algorithm simulations, and the off-diagonal panels are from the human–algorithm
treatments. The scatterplots show the proportions of Left play by the Row and Column players in each pair after the first 23
iterations. In the simulation panel we only use the data from the single simulated experiment used to calculate the values
in Table 4. Also, each off-diagonal scatterplot displays a trend line, which is obtained by regressing the Computers’
proportions of Left on the Humans’ proportions of Left.
Inspecting the two main diagonal panels of each figure reveals that both human–human play and pure simulations of
model interactions generate uncorrelated ‘‘clouds’’ of joint Left frequencies with the simulations’ clouds exhibiting much
less dispersion, consistent with the statistics reported in Table 4. The scatterplots of human–algorithm play are
dramatically different. In most of the off-diagonal panels the joint frequencies exhibit strong linear correlations. Moreover,
the linear relationship suggests that the algorithms’ frequencies adjust toward best responding to the frequencies of their
human opponents.
These notions are quantitatively expressed in Table 5. In this table we report for each scatterplot the correlation
coefficient and a hypothesis test of whether the coefficient is different than zero. For four of the five pure human treatmentPlease cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007
Fig. 6. Gamble-Safe joint densities of proportion Left; RE interactions.
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result in the human–algorithm treatments. We do reject zero correlation for four out of six of the human–algorithm cases.
Moreover, for each of the human–algorithm treatments, the sign of the correlation coefficient is consistent with linear
better response by the algorithm.
One example really highlights the result that the algorithms linearly better respond – rather than best respond – to
human play. Consider the upper right scatter plot of Fig. 6. In this scatterplot, Column RE players face human Row players
in the Gamble-Safe game. One of the human players chose his Minimax strategy, Right, exclusively and his computer RE
opponent best responded to this only about 70% of the time. More striking is how all the observations in this panel,
including this extreme observation, very closely align with the fitted line.
We further explore the idea that the learning algorithms are better than the human subjects at detecting and adjusting
to exploitable play by presenting the OLS results of regressing the learning algorithms’ Left frequencies on their human
counterparts’ Left frequencies.18 A learning algorithm that is highly sensitive and adjusts systematically to opponents’ play
should generate regressions that explain a high percentage of the variance of the algorithm’s Left frequencies, and the
estimated slope coefficient should be consistent with the best response correspondence. These features are found in
Table 6 regressions: the slope of each regression has the correct sign, three of the regressions have exceedingly large
adjusted R2 statistics, and a fourth is still quite large considering the data is cross sectional. These adjusted R2 results
reflect the tight clustering to the fitted regression line observed in the scatterplots. Correspondingly, F-tests for these four
regressions do not reject the significance of the regressions at the 5% level of significance. Interestingly, the two cases
where F-tests reject the regressions are when the EWA and RE algorithms assume the Column role in the Pursue-Evade
game. We do not see a reason for the differential performance, but do note that the mean of the computers’ data is close to
their minimax strategy in this case.
To summarize, we see that the frequency of Left play by the learning algorithms moves toward (but not all the way to)
best response, and the magnitude of these responses by the algorithms is described by a surprisingly predictable linear
relationship. So can we conclude that the learning algorithms out play humans?18 When running these regression we are now assuming that there is a causality which we did not assume in the correlation analysis. Given the
consistency of the correlations with the direction of best response for the computer we feel that the assumption is not too egregious.
Please cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007
Fig. 7. Pursue-Evade joint densities of proportion Left; RE interactions.
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Previous arguments established that the learning algorithms sensitively detect human opponents’ exploitable action
choice frequencies and then the algorithms respond with linear better responses. However, we will now see that these
statistically significant responses are too weak in magnitude to generate statistically significant payoff gains. Table 7
presents the average stage game winnings for all decision maker types when pitted against a human for each role and
game. If the learning algorithms successfully exploit human decision makers, we would expect the algorithms in each
game and role to have greater winnings than a human when playing against a human in the competing role. The average
stage game winnings in Table 7 do not exhibit this trait.
The reported average stage game payoff statistics are calculated by first taking the total session payoffs for each
decision maker who plays against a human, and dividing by the number of stage games played. Then we partition these
decision makers according to the game played, role played, and decision maker type. Finally, we report the average stage
game payoffs across decision makers in each partition. For each game and player role we conduct both a t-test, with
assumed different variances, and a Mann–Whitney U-test for the null hypothesis that on average a computer decision
maker earns the same as a human when the opponent is a human. At a 5% level of significance we fail to reject the null
hypothesis in four out of the six cases for both tests. In the two rejections, the human average actually exceeds the
algorithm average.
These two rejections merit closer inspection because it is tempting to conclude that human subjects are able to
‘‘outsmart’’ the algorithms, even though the learning algorithms appear to be linearly better responding to the opponents
more often over the course of play. In fact, this is one of the noteworthy results presented by Duersch et al. (2010). We
show this is not the case here, as the rejections arise from the combination of two other factors: (1) the timidness of the
algorithm to best respond, as dictated by the probabilistic choice rule; and (2) these are the two cases where Human play
differs depending on whether the opponent is an algorithm or another human.
Let us first consider the Gamble-Safe sessions with Human Column players, where we see Human Row players on
average earn more than RE Row players. In Fig. 9 we first graph a family of iso-expected payoff curves for the Row player as
a function of the joint frequency of Left play by the Row and Column player. Notice that the Row player expects a payoff of
one whenever he plays Left with probability zero (i.e., he chooses the safe action) or the Column player plays his Nash
equilibrium Left frequency of fifty percent. More importantly, whenever Column plays Left more than 50% of the timePlease cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007
Fig. 8. Pursue-Evade joint densities of proportion Left; EWA interactions.
Table 5
Correlation coefficients by game and interaction factors.
Game Row player Column player Correlation coefficient t-statistic d.o.f. p-value
Gamble-Safe Human Human 0.379 1.533 14 0.148
Gamble-Safe Human RE 0.982 17.441 11 0.000
Gamble-Safe RE Human 0.928 8.285 11 0.000
Gamble-Safe RE RE 0.270 1.220 19 0.237
Pursue-Evade Human Human 0.383 1.805 19 0.087
Pursue-Evade Human RE 0.338 1.345 14 0.200
Pursue-Evade RE Human 0.930 9.450 14 0.000
Pursue-Evade RE RE 0.490 2.452 19 0.024
Pursue-Evade Human EWA 0.314 1.237 15 0.237
Pursue-Evade EWA Human 0.581 2.674 14 0.018
Pursue-Evade EWA EWA 0.200 0.891 19 0.384
J. Shachat, J.T. Swarthout / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]14Row’s expected payoff is bounded below by one, and whenever Column plays Left less than 50% of the time Row’s expected
payoff is bounded above by one.
Next we plot the joint frequencies of Left play for Human Row versus Human Column pairs (denoted with open circle
marks) and the RE Row versus Human Column pairs (denoted with solid triangle marks). When facing Human Row players,
7 of the 15 Human Column players choose Left more than half the time and thus ensuring that their opponents expected
payoff is greater than one. However, the RE Row players typically face less favorable opportunities. When facing RE Row
players, 9 out of the 12 Human Column players choose Left less than 50% of the time. In these nine instances, the only way
the RE Row player can expect to achieve a payoff equal to the average Human Row payoff of 0.99 would be to exclusively
best respond and always choose right. Of course, the probabilistic choice rule prevents consistent best responding.
We next consider the Pursue-Evade sessions with Human Row players, where we see Human Column players on
average earn more than EWA Column players. In Fig. 10 we first graph a family of iso-expected payoff curves for the
Column player as a function of the joint frequency of Left play by the Row and Column players. We see that the Column
player expects to earn their minimax payoff of 0.67 whenever either the Row or Column player plays their minimax Left
frequency of two-thirds. We have already observed that the EWA Column players earn less than the minimax payoff,Please cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007
Table 6
OLS regression results, computer left frequency¼ aþbnsubject left frequency.




Adjusted R-square F-stat F-stat p-value
Gamble-Safe RE Row Column 0.07 0.66 0.85 62.40 0.00
(2.11) (7.90)
Gamble-Safe RE Column Row 0.75 0.69 0.96 276.54 0.00
(40.03) (16.63)
Pursue-Evade RE Row Column 0.26 1.16 0.85 82.92 0.00
(2.89) (9.11)
Pursue-Evade RE Column Row 0.72 0.21 0.05 1.68 0.22
(9.40) (1.30)
Pursue-Evade EWA Row Column 0.28 0.29 0.29 6.64 0.02
(3.24) (2.58)
Pursue-Evade EWA Column Row 0.69 0.20 0.03 1.42 0.25
(8.85) (1.19)
Table 7
Average stage game payoffs for decision makers when facing a human opponent.
Game Human role Human’s opponent Decision maker avg. payoff t-stat Approx. d.o.f. p-value Mann–Whitney U-stat p-value
Gamble-Safe Row Human Column 1.0776 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Gamble-Safe Row RE Column 1.0786 0.012 23 0.990 0.224 0.808
Gamble-Safe Column Human Row 0.9888 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Gamble-Safe Column RE Row 0.8983 2.187 25 0.038 2.123 0.034
Pursue-Evade Row Human Column 0.6709 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pursue-Evade Row RE Column 0.6829 0.498 32 0.622 0.567 0.571
Pursue-Evade Row EWA Column 0.7205 2.312 33 0.027 2.00 0.046
Pursue-Evade Column Human Row 0.6709 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pursue-Evade Column RE Row 0.6395 1.285 31 0.208 1.533 0.125
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Fig. 9. Row payoff contours and joint frequencies for RE and human Row players versus human Column Payers in Gamble-Safe game.
J. Shachat, J.T. Swarthout / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 15which is roughly what the Human Column players earn when facing Human Row players. This is also evident in Fig. 10
when we look at the scatterplot of the joint frequencies of Left play for EWA Column versus Human Row pairs (denoted
with solid triangle marks). Notice that for all of these pairs the Human Row player chooses Left less than two-thirds of the
time, and in all but one case the EWA opponent best responds, by choosing Left, more than half the time.
So why are EWA decision makers earning less than their minimax payoff? From the formulation of the algorithm one
sees that if the opponent plays his minimax strategy then both Left and Right will tend to have similar values overtime.
Accordingly, the probabilistic choice rule leads the EWA algorithm to play Left and Right with equal frequency. Now as thePlease cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
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Fig. 10. Column payoff contours and joint frequencies for EWA and human Column players versus human Row payers in Pursue-Evade game.
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the best response. This is what we observe, but in this instance the magnitude of the algorithm’s choice frequency
adjustment is so small that it fails to approach its minimax strategy of two-thirds. As we see from the location of the level
curves, by failing to best respond at least two-thirds of the time the EWA algorithm earns less than the minimax payoff.
This surprising result is due to the fact that EWA does not assess payoffs relative to what it can achieve via its minimax
strategy and that its probabilistic choice rule leads to weak adjustments that are based relative to the equiprobable mixed
strategy.
At this point, the human–algorithm treatments have provided us with the identification of two previously unknown
properties of the learning-in-games models: the models adjust linearly toward their best responses to human play, and the
adjustments are extremely weak. Now we turn our attention to the question of what the human–algorithm treatments tell
us about human subject play.5.4. Human play conditional on opponent decision maker type
Past studies have demonstrated that humans play differently against Nash equilibrium strategies than they do against
other humans. However, we have also presented evidence that play by learning algorithms is more responsive to
opponents’ decisions than human play is. A natural question to ask is: when unaware of opponent type, do humans play
differently against learning algorithms than they do against other humans? To answer this question we compare the
empirical distributions of the proportions of Left play by humans when facing the different decision-making types as
presented in the scatterplots of Figs. 6–8. We report a series of Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample goodness-of-fit tests
(hereafter denoted KS) comparing the distributions of Human Left play proportions when facing human opponents to
Human Left play proportions when facing the alternative algorithms. The main result is that we do not observe differences
in human play except in two cases: when the human is the Row player in the Pursue-Evade game and when the human is
the Column player in the Gamble-Safe game. These are the same two cases we just discussed for which subjects out-
earned algorithms. Of course, informing the subjects of opponent type may indeed change these results.
Fig. 11 shows the empirical CDFs of proportion of Left play by human Row players as they face human, RE, and EWA
Column decision maker types in the Pursue-Evade game. Additionally, the figure reports the results of Kolmogorov–
Smirnov tests of whether the Humans’ distribution of Left play frequencies differs when facing an algorithm opponent as
opposed to a human opponent. Previously we have observed that the learning algorithms performed differently in the
Column role of the Pursue-Evade game than in any other situation. This trend continues as the proportions of Left by
humans in the Row role are significantly different when facing each learning algorithm than when facing another human.
Next we consider the CDFs generated by human Column players when playing against Human, RE, and EWA Row
decision maker types in the Pursue-Evade game. We see in Fig. 12 that play against human opponents is statistically
indistinguishable from play against both EWA and RE opponents.
Next, we turn our attention to human play in the Gamble-Safe game. Fig. 13 shows that human Row players’ CDFs of
proportion of Left play are not statistically different as they face Human and RE Column decision maker types. Finally, the
CDFs and associated KS tests generated by human Column players in the Gamble-Safe game are shown in Fig. 14. We see
that play against human opponents differs from play against RE opponents at the six-percent level of significance.Please cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
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Fig. 11. Distributions of left by human Row players in Pursue-Evade.






















Fig. 12. Distributions of left by human Column players in Pursue-Evade.
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We present an experiment in which humans play games against computer-implemented learning algorithms, and
establish that humans neither detect nor exploit the non-stationary, but rather viscous, mixed strategy processes of the RE
and EWA algorithms. Our experiment also establishes that the learning models are more sensitive than humans in
detecting exploitable opponent play. Furthermore, we show that the learning algorithms’ action choice frequencies
respond uniformly and linearly to opponents’ non-equilibrium action choice frequencies. However, the corresponding
mixed strategy adjustments of the learning models in response to detected exploitable play are too weak to increase their
payoffs.
Our results, in conjunction with those of other studies, reveal a different depiction of human learning in games than
those suggested by currently proposed models of adaptive behavior. First, through the technique of pitting humans againstPlease cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007





















Fig. 13. Distributions of left by human Row players in Gamble-Safe.





















Fig. 14. Distributions of left by human Column players in Gamble-Safe.
J. Shachat, J.T. Swarthout / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]]18algorithms we know that humans successfully increase their payoffs (but not as much as possible) against non-optimal but
stationary mixed strategy play and against adaptive play that generates highly serially correlated action sequences. On the
other hand humans do not exploit the subtle dynamic mixed strategy processes of the learning models examined in
this paper.
Some sources of behavioral departure between learning models and humans are identified in experiments that elicit
subjects’ beliefs (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002) or subjects’ mixed strategies (Shachat, 2002). Elicited beliefs are highly
volatile and often times correspond to a belief that one action will be chosen with certainty. Similarly, elicited mixed
strategies show erratic adjustments and a significant amount of pure strategy play.
Despite the deficiencies uncovered here, the RE and EWA models have many applications in the literature, as there are
few alternative models which allow for such rich dynamic adjustments of the relative assessments between strategies and
corresponding dynamics of proportional choices. So a productive way to proceed would be to ask how can one adjust the
formulations of these models to address the issues of muted response to payoff increasing opportunities and thePlease cite this article as: Shachat, J., Swarthout, J.T., Learning about learning in games through experimental control of
strategic interdependence. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2011.09.007
J. Shachat, J.T. Swarthout / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control ] (]]]]) ]]]–]]] 19oversensitivity, relative to human decision makers, of payoff assessments? To this end we suggest four possible directions
in formulation and model selection:1.P
s
Adopt coarser assessment functions: With a continuous probabilistic choice function, increasing the variance of the
random component of payoff assessments will lead to more switching of the most likely chosen action choice, but
pushes away from best response to toward equiprobable choice. However, while reducing this variance leads to best
response, it also leads to highly positive serially correlated action choices as long as the ‘‘observed’’ component payoff
assessments adjust smoothly. Thus, under the probabilistic choice formulation one can try to use assessment functions
that are coarse and discontinuous. This is a key element of the success of Nyarko and Schotter (2002) model in which
they assess payoffs according to the subjects’ elicited beliefs—which display high variance. Of course, this model has
the drawback that it is quite unusual to have the needed individual forecast information available.2. Change what is probabilistic: One could formulate a model in which the payoff assessments are random but the choice
rule is to best reply with probability one. For example, Shachat and Swarthout (2004) consider a belief based learning
model in which each player’s stage game beliefs regarding the opponent’s action are random variables with a hierarchal
probability structure for which the hyper-parameters are functions of the game history. With respect to action choice,
each player simply best responds to his realized belief. This model’s shortcoming is that it does not make use of one of
the lessons taught by RE and EWA that assessment adjustments differ for actions played versus those that were not
played.3. Incorporate richer individual heterogeneity: One productive direction in the learning-in-games literature is the
incorporation of individual level heterogeneity either exogenously (Camerer and Ho, 1998; Ho et al., 2008) or
endogenously (Ho et al., 2007; Spiliopoulos, 2008). These significant advances are difficult to assess with the
methodology of this study. In order to apply the techniques here, one would need to estimate and sample from the
distribution of the models’ random coefficients. This would require a much grander scale experiment than we
conducted. We do suggest an alternative way to model heterogeneity. Consider a set of learning rules and treat them as
a state space in which a subject’s adoption is a latent variable. Then, one can model the dynamics of their adoption as a
Markov process. This type of hidden Markov modeling is common in biostatistics and speech recognition, but seldom
used in behavioral game theory.4. Consider alternative model selection criteria: The maximum likelihood and minimum square forecast error criteria for
estimating EWA and RE parameters lead to strong fits of the mean but not the other moments of experimental data, as
we observe when we compare pure model simulation to human experimental outcomes. One alternative would be to
estimate parameters that give the best fit of the first and second moments of joint play in either the aggregate or time
series analysis. A second alternative would be to consider the same approach but to fit the moments between pure
human treatments and the hybrid treatments we consider. Of course, this would be very costly in terms of time and
money, and how does one adjust parameter values after each iteration of hybrid play?
In conclusion, this study establishes benchmarks which new learning models should explain. Furthermore, the use of
human–algorithm interactions can play an important role in future efforts to identify how humans adapt in strategic
environments. First, the technique brings increased power in evaluating proposed models and overcomes some current
econometric and numerical limitations. Second, this technique can be used to identify human learning behavior through
the adoption of carefully selected algorithms and the subsequent measurement of human responses to these algorithms. In
doing so, the algorithms are not being directly evaluated but rather used as carefully chosen stimuli to control for strategic
interdependence and produce informative measurements of human behavior.Acknowledgments
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